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SECURITY AND TERRORISM
An economist who is only an economist, is not an economist.
– J. S. Mill
Security, as a concept, is usually approached and analysed by researchers in the
areas of policing, justice, politics and defence. It is less common to see defence
economists intervening in this debate, although for a long time they did indeed
examine the economic aspects of war and peace, under the heading ‘Economics of
Security’.
Since 9/11, however, more and more emphasis has been placed on terrorism and on
organised crime, together with the associated policy.
It is clear today that security cannot be understood without a certain degree of
ambiguity. This paper addresses security’s equivocal nature from the point of view of
a defence economist and analyses its similarities and differences.
Even before the end of the Cold War, Western Europe lived in the assumption of a
stable, even peaceful environment. However, since 2001, terrorist attacks have
continued worldwide. Terrorism has become the primary threat, and many countries
have clearly become targets.
France has endured the most attacks in Western Europe. Since 1982, France has
suffered nearly 20 attacks, resulting in many deaths. Many other countries have also
been impacted, like the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Sweden, and others.
The observation that Europe – or rather the values that it represents – has become
a prime target for Daesh as well as a theatre for terrorist operations, is something of
an understatement. Europe has also turned into a jihadist recruiting pool. Today, we
are dealing with a multifaceted threat with roots both inside and outside our
borders. Potentially, no European citizen is safe.2
COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE GROUND IN BELGIUM
The 21st century has begun as an era of uncertainty,
with a heightened focus on security and public safety.
– Gavin Newsom
Belgium has not been spared from terrorist threats and attacks. The deadliest were
the suicide attacks organised by Daesh on 22 March 2016 in Brussels Airport and at
the Maelbeek subway station, which resulted in 32 deaths.
But already on the night of 20 November 2015, following information that several
dangerous terrorists were lurking in Brussels a week after the murderous attacks in
Paris, the alert level rose to its maximum in Brussels. Potential targets included major
events, shopping malls, public transportation and shopping streets. There was even
a lockdown for a week: schools, nurseries, sports and cultural centres, cinemas,
shopping malls and public offices were closed, and sporting events as well as
concerts were cancelled. The streets were completely deserted and armoured
vehicles were even stationed on the Grand Place.
Belgium’s present counterterrorist actions in the field began on 15 January 2015,
when the Belgian police conducted a successful major armed operation in Verviers
against an armed terrorist cell that was planning imminent attacks across the entire
Belgian territory.
On 17 January 2015, the Cabinet gave approval for the immediate domestic opera-
tional deployment of 300 soldiers to carry out surveillance and monitoring tasks for
an initial – but renewable – period of one month in support of the Federal Police.
Following the decision of the Council of Ministers and consultation with the National
Security Council1 (NSC), a protocol agreement determining the legalities of the
implementation modalities for the Ministry of Defence’s support for the Federal
Public Service Interior (Ministry of Home Affairs) was established. It came into force
on 15 January. The NSC analysis is always based on the evaluation of the Organisation
for Threat Analysis Coordination (Organe de Coordination pour l’Analyse de la
Menace, OCAM), communicated to the Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service
Internal Affairs, but only when a specific general threat level (level 3) is reached.
Several different federal public services are involved in the fight against terrorism
and are coordinating their efforts.2 Among them, OCAM’s mission is to perform
1 Royal Decree of 28 January 2015 establishing the National Security Council.
2 http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/terrorism/fight_against_
terrorism, accessed 22 August 2016.3
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Belgium3 since December 2006.4
There are four levels on OCAM’s scale of threat determination:
• Level 1 is equivalent to a weak risk of terrorist attack.
• Level 2 is considered to represent an average threat and signifies an unlikely
threat of attack.
• Level 3 is regarded as serious, and implies a possible and likely terrorist attack.
• Level 4, the highest, means that the threat is very serious and imminent.
The practice of defence forces supporting the integrated police has, however,
become a recurrent policy. Indeed, since January 2015, the Council of Ministers has
repeatedly approved the continued deployment of troops in the field after consid-
ering the views of the Strategic Committee of Intelligence and Security5 and the
threat analysis conducted at least weekly by OCAM.
Thirty months after the Verviers operation, the military are still on the streets. Two
distinct operations remain ongoing: Operation Vigilant Guardian (OVG), the support
contributed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to the Federal Police with regards to
terrorist threat, and Operation Spring Guardian (OSG), an immediate response
capacity provided by the MoD to secure nuclear sites.6
The government continues to determine the degree of support provided by the
Belgian armed forces on a monthly basis. This suggests that this decision was not
initially intended to constitute a long-term policy. Under the constraint of the OCAM
analyses, on-the-street realities and probably public opinion, the presence of the
soldiers has ceased to be questioned.
Is this situation temporarily permanent or permanently temporary? In any event, this
shows both the duality and the complementarity between external and internal
security.
3 Royal Decree of 28 November 2006 implementing the Law of 10 July 2006 on the threat analysis.
4 Law of 10 July 2006 on Threat Analysis (M. B. 20 July 2006).
5 Comité Stratégique du Renseignement et de la Sécurité – CSRS.
6 On 15 September 2016, the Council of Ministers extended until 19 December 2016 the protocol relating to
the protection of nuclear power stations by the Federal Police. Pending the entry into service of a security
corps, a protocol between the MoD and the Federal Police provides for a military commitment for this
mission. A detachment of 140 military personnel is deployed in support of existing unarmed private security
personnel.4
THE DEIXIS OF SECURITY
At the end of the day, the goals are simple: safety and security.
– Jodi Rell
While the police traditionally embody security, the current military presence in the
streets of most big cities has led analysts to scrutinise an increasingly hazy interpre-
tation of the concept. Several aspects may be involved in the political, diplomatic,
economic, financial, social, health and environmental spheres.
The Federal Police are customarily viewed as the natural guardians of security. In the
present government of Prime Minister Charles Michel, a ‘Security and Home Affairs
Minister’ has even been appointed. This designation is, of course, a reference to
internal security, related to public order, civil security and domestic threats.
On the other hand, the MoD oversees external security, namely protection against
armed aggression and external threats. Defence policy is subordinated to foreign
policy and determined by respect for alliances, treaties and international agree-
ments.
Security is therefore a much broader concept and gives way to a dichotomous inter-
pretation: the national security strategy embraces both external and domestic
security, and implements military, civil, economic and diplomatic means.
Consequently, security is the first service owed by a state to her citizens. Therefore,
the Minister of Defence could equally well be depicted as the Minister of Security,
just like his colleague in Internal Affairs.
However, the notion that concerns this paper is based on its sovereign functions:
External Security (MoD) and Internal Security (the Federal Police).
  
Any terrorism is an attack on libertarian values.
– P. J. O’Rourke
Overall, security must allow us to live in freedom as well granting us the opportunity
to lead a fulfilling life. Consequently, one fundamental of security consists in the
protection of basic liberties; it is therefore appropriate to refer to some inescapable
articles in basic international declarations and agreements.
The call for security is logically based on the need to take advantage of all the
individual and collective freedoms, as provided in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Paris, 1948). Belgium guarantees 14 fundamental, collective and5
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its quintessence: ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised to all
Belgians must be ensured without discrimination’.
In the context of these fundamental statements, the Federal Police and MoD have
specific roles.
Security, a pure or an impure public good?
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety,
deserve neither Liberty nor Safety
Benjamin Franklin
Another aspect of their complementarity consists in the fact that these two faces of
the security of a country, which are also sovereign functions, are nothing less than
public goods. Indeed, they are not supposed to be consumed individually, but by all
members of the community.
A public good is a necessary commodity for the functioning of society, usually
provided by the state. There is a wide range of goods from a pure public good to a
private good, via impure public goods.
A pure public good has two well-defined properties:
a) Non-rivalry: a pure public good can be enjoyed simultaneously by all potential
consumers; they can enjoy not only the same amount of the good as any other
individual, but also the entire available quantity.
b) Non-excludability: once the good has been created, it is impossible to exclude
individuals from the enjoyment of it – or it is extremely costly to do so.
The corollary of the second property lies in its indivisibility: benefits resulting from
consumption of a pure public good are indivisible; all individuals use the same
quantity of the public good.
The financial aspect brings another confirmation: no additional cost should be
incurred if an additional individual becomes the consumer of a pure public good; in
other words, a pure public good has a marginal cost of zero.
When one of the above criteria are not fully respected, the public good becomes
impure.
7 La Constitution belge, 7 February 1831. The current Constitution is online on Belgian monitor site, the Coor-
dinated Belgian Constitution, 17 February 1994, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?
language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1994021730, accessed 20 September 2016.6
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homogeneous, the specific instances of defence and policing should be scrutinised
separately.
In an ideal world, defence fully meets the criteria of a pure public good, since every
citizen ‘consumes’ the same amount of defence, even if his approach to this public
good is unalike. Therefore, everyone benefits in equal measure, whether he contrib-
utes a lot, little or not at all.
Nonetheless, this applies only if defence plays a dissuasive role, as in the days of the
Cold War, when any attack was dissuaded by the capacity of the protagonists. Every
citizen enjoyed defence in all its aspects, even if, like anti-militarists, they did not
desire it. Defence, in its deterrent role, was without any doubt a pure public good.
This is, however, different in times of war, i.e., if deterrence fails. Defence then
becomes an action tool on the ground (boots on the ground), and the consumption
of defence resources for the protection of a priority objective can only be done at the
expense of other sectors. Each operational plot implies in fact a differentiation in
efforts, a prioritization. As a result, defence is characterised by rivalry, exclusivity and
divisibility and becomes an impure public good.
Today, the ‘classic’ threat of a nuclear war between two major antagonistic blocs has
disappeared, giving way to many polymorphic and diffuse risks. In the event of
peacekeeping or peace restoring missions, and even in the framework of humani-
tarian assignments, defence is blatantly an impure public good from the viewpoint
of the beneficiaries of its interventions.
Policing also contributes to security. However, contrary to its external equivalent,
internal security comes in more concrete forms, and hence police activities are well
known by citizens. Knee-jerk reactions against police work are, therefore, rarer than
those against the military.
Unlike defence, policing never evolves in ‘peacetime’ and never behaves like a pure
public good. In practice, every police intervention in favour of an individual citizen
prevents many other ‘consumers’ from benefitting from the security provided.
For instance, during major events and sports competitions, such as the Olympics or
Football World Cups, police reinforcements from across the organising country are
mobilised, resulting in a lower level of security in small towns.7
DEFENCE AND POLICE MISSION STATEMENTS
The Constitution does not exhaustively describe and therefore imposes no limits on
the MoD’s role in maintaining security. It follows that domestic operations are not
contrary to the Constitution. But given that the primary task of the armed forces is
still maintaining national independence and territorial integrity (Article 91), other
tasks are justified only insofar as they do not endanger the primary task.8
Therefore, the protection of national interests is enhanced by the implementation of
Belgium’s national security strategy in an international context, namely commit-
ments arising from the United Nations Charter and the Treaties of Lisbon and
Washington.
In his updated Mission Statement for Defence,9 Belgium’s Chief of Defence (CHOD)
stressed in 2014 that
Defence contributes to secure peace in the world and to the defence of the
interests of our nation by maintaining and committing military capabilities, if
necessary with the legitimate use of force to ensure the security of our nation
and its allies and to preserve the founding values of our society and to
promote them in Belgium as well as abroad.
This includes participation in the collective defence and collective protection of vital
and essential interests, protection of fellow citizens or Belgian interests abroad;
partaking in security operations, in peacekeeping and peace enforcement opera-
tions, as well as in humanitarian operations.
The armed forces can also be deployed in aid of the nation, for instance, in cases of
serious political or social conflicts.10
It should, however, be noted that the contribution of the MoD to the security of
Belgian society within national borders is to be exercised solely based on expertise
or military capabilities, or when civil resources are inadequate. Hence, other tasks,
such as aid to the nation, are only really justified insofar as they do not compromise
the main task.
  
8 J. VELAERS, 103.
9 Déclaration de mission de la Défense et cadre stratégique pour la mise en condition, CHOD-mission – Édition
1 (March 2014). Diffusion Interne. CabCHOD.
10 These contributions were very rare: in 1950, during the insurgency following the referendum over the
monarchy; in 1960 throughout the general strike; in 1966 on the occasion of the mine closure in Limburg,
and in 1985 during the Communist Combatant Cells terrorist attacks.8
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– Mark Udall
The National Security Plan (NSP) 2016-201911 is the ultimate police mission state-
ment. The title of this NSP – Together to the heart of the matter – emphasises integral
cooperation between the integrated police and their partners in the security chain.
The NSP determines ten security issues. However, no specific mention is made of the
MoD or the military.
In France, a government plan called ‘Vigipirate’ was created in 1978 and reformed in
2014 to adapt to sustained terrorist threats. It involves the deployment of significant
numbers of military personnel in the streets.
In Germany, internal and external security operations are clearly delineated. Patrols
of soldiers, rifles slung over their shoulders, are now commonplace in France and in
Belgium, but constitute a taboo in Germany. Since 17 August 2012, the German
Constitutional Court has, however, authorised the deployment of the armed forces
‘in the event of an exceptional catastrophic situation’ and ‘as a last resort’. It is,
however, for the government to estimate the cases of extreme urgency justifying
such an operation. After the shooting that left nine dead in Munich on 22 July 2016,
there was no agreement within the government on deploying military police as
proposed by the Minister of Defence. The same refusal emerged after the attack on
19 December 2016 in Berlin.
11 National Security Plan 2016-2019, police publication presented on 7 June 2016, http://www.police.be/files/
fed/files/ORG/INT/NSP2016-2019-S.pdf, accessed 20 September 2016.9
THE FLUCTUATING PRIORITIES OF BELGIUM’S 
SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS
There is no doubt that our nation’s security and
defeating terrorism trump all other priorities.
– Arlen Specter
Economics, as a science of scarcity, finds justification in its fundamental paradigm:
the needs of an individual and of groups of individuals are unlimited, while the means
capable of satisfying them are rare. All economic activity therefore involves defini-
tions of priorities, classifications, decision and choices.
Those in charge of all aspects of the Economics of Security claim that they are victims
of the consolidation of public finances and of European constraints imposed via the
Stability and Growth Pact. In times of financial crisis, all government branches must
show solidarity and participate in the reduction of their expenses. Cutting defence,
policing and intelligence budgets became a popular trend that was less costly
electorally for politicians than reducing investment budgets or social benefits.
Obviously, security should also participate in the solidary strengthening of public
finances, but policymakers, as well as the public, care little about this, particularly
when it comes to defence. Security budgets have been in the crosshairs for decades.
In all public sectors, debates are passionate and each decision-maker claims that his
own goals can no longer be achieved.
It is interesting to determine whether the savings have been across the board in all
public departments. To verify this, one cannot use the statistics of the different
Federal Public Services or ministries, as they are far from consistent over a longer
period, considering, on the one hand, the number of governments in Belgium and,
therefore, the number of administrations, and on the other hand, the changes in
ministerial attributions and fluctuating distribution of competencies between the
different levels of government.
It is therefore imperative to appeal to the Classification of the Functions of Govern-
ment12 (COFOG) statistics. According to this method, government spending regroups
the expenditures of ‘functions’, regardless of the departmental organisation and
budget on which they depend. These statistics, available from 1995 on, are therefore
the most relevant in comparing the ten functional categories of government
spending13: public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs,
12 United Nations Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4, accessed 25
August 2016.
13 Struys (CRAIG, 2014) used these data for the first time to compare the financial evolution of the MoD with
those of other government functions. Actualised data accessed on 29 January 2017.10
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culture and religion, education and social protection.
Two are relevant to our argument:
• The function of defence is broken down as follows: military defence, civil defence,
foreign military aid, defence research and development, defence not elsewhere
classified (n.e.c.).
• Policing is part of the function ‘public order and safety’: police services, fire-
protection services, law courts, prisons, resarch and design for public order and
safety, public order and safety n.e.c.
The first important deduction,14 is that in 2015 these two functions represented only
4.79% of the total public administration expenditures: the breakdown of this total
allots 1.55% for defence, and 1.97% for policing. Security lato sensu thus barely
arrives at 3.24%..
To assess the evolution of the purchasing power of security budgets, which deter-
mine the potential to achieve the optimum levels of efficiency and effectiveness, the
most relevant criterion consists of their evolution in chained euros, a method that
removes the effect of price changes from changes in value.
Concerning the most relevant evolution criterion, the progression of the expenditure
in chained euros15 considered over the period 1995-2015, leads to the following
conclusions: the purchasing power of the MoD decreased by 18.54%, while total
public expenditure recorded a growth of 44.8%. The statistics show, on the other
hand, that the public order and safety function budget increased by 77.08%.
The defence budget has indeed been most severely affected by financial cuts; it is,
however, totally wrong to claim, as many do, that this has only been the case since
the twenty-first century crises. In fact, defence has been undergoing a price index
jump since 1985 (Cf. Struys). The government has never given security a high priority.
Struys’ conclusions, based on 2014 data (RMB 2014), are confirmed by the latest
available figures showing that the defence budget’s purchasing power has been
dramatically reduced since the 1980s. When we compare this to the evolution of
GDP purchasing power, it is evident that defence not only loses funds during a reces-
sion, but also in economic boom years. The defence budget and GDP essentially
evolve in opposition.
14 My analysis is based on statistics published by the National Bank of Belgium Online statistics. Government
spending by functions and transactions, http://stat.nbb.be/?lang=en&SubSessionId=b980e18c-b27b-426e-
89af-f131ee53dce0&themetreeid=-200, accessed on 4 June 2017.
15 In the national accounts statistical system, an earlier technique of using constant prices based on a fixed
base year was replaced by an annual updating of the reference year that allowed a calculating growth at
chained volume measures. This removes the effect of price changes from the changes in value. The choice
of the reference year has no influence on the growth profile of the series.11
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and 2015, or a loss of 46.73%, while GDP has increased by EUR 190.5 billion, or
87.2%. Defence has therefore been treated very shabbily for three and a half
decades.12
A PR OPERATION
Contrary to what some argued at the beginning of the operation, the presence of
soldiers in the streets is certainly not indicative of a coming coup d’état in Belgium.
Nevertheless, the Belgian population traditionally demonstrates very little empathy
towards the armed forces, and even exhibits a significant dose of anti-militarism.
Before the operation in Verviers, the armed forces could only count on about 20%
favourable reviews. Since the attacks, this percentage has risen to 72%. Moreover,
people have become accustomed to the presence of soldiers in the streets; 65% of
the population were in favour of keeping the military on the streets.
Even better, at the end of 2016, as many as 81% of Belgians showed confidence in
their armed forces, an increase of 10% compared to 2015. The MoD is now the public
institution that carries the most sympathy according to the Standard Eurobarometer
86 (Autumn 2016) commissioned by the European Commission.
In fact, the soldiers have contributed less to their operational mission than to the
psychological support of citizens and to a confidence building effect. By installing
soldiers in the streets, the government helped to rehabilitate symbolically a profes-
sion of which many Belgians were genuinely ignorant.
Some insist that the presence of soldiers on the street creates a deterrent effect,
dissuading terrorists from carrying out attacks. It is obviously difficult, if not impos-
sible, to assess how many attacks have been prevented by OVG. Granted, deterrence
is only theoretical when a military deployment is visible and easily circumvented.
If dissuasion does indeed pay off, it is in another area altogether. One positive collat-
eral effect is undeniably the decline in petty crime. As a result, some mayors would
be disappointed to see the return of the soldiers to their core activities – i.e.,
manoeuvres or deployment abroad – whereas an increase of the number of military
at events such as music festivals, fairs and amusement parks is regularly required.
This has led to bizarre results: during national holiday celebrations on 21 July 2016,
there were more military deployed in the streets than in the military parade. During
the visit of President Trump on 25 May 2017, the security deployment was further
expanded by 250 military personnel in addition to the existing 1,200.
Motivation, missions and operational constraints
While at first the soldiers felt proud to be able to prove themselves and participate
in a PR operation, their motivation eventually took a hit.
Indeed, forced to confine themselves to an unusual posture in front of buildings, in
shopping malls, concert halls, stations, airports or prisons, or even to patrol in streets13
THE BLURRING OF BELGIUM’S SECURITY: DELIBERATE OR UNINTENDED?without being able to take any initiative or even intervene, the military has run out
of patience and are now carrying out their ‘missions’ very reluctantly.
The discomfort they experience may seem minor at first, but has become increas-
ingly uncomfortable and even unbearable:
• The missions are long and tedious, and tend to be extended constantly, with
weekly rotations; in 2015, some soldiers even performed 22 weeks of guard duty.
• Unlike the police, the military do not return home in the evening or after their
shift.
• They must accept many extra hours that are impossible to recover.
• Some leaves are cancelled and many cannot even take their holidays.
• In many cases, an external mission is extended by a month’s extra duty in OVG.
• The family impact of such an intensive and frustrating work regimen is cumber-
some and creates marital problems.
• The military feels less and less useful and has become demotivated, even demor-
alised.
• This professional life therefore does not really constitute a selling point for
attracting young people to the armed forces, even with generous financial
recompenses.
Since the 1990s, the external missions of the armed forces have become a priority. It
follows that the deployment of the armed forces in the streets is very cumbersome,
too heavy even to bear, especially since the beginning of 2016 and even more so
since the attacks at Brussels Airport and the Maelbeek metro station on 22 March
2016.
At the end of 2016, 73% of the available military from the Land Component were
deployed in the OVG mission. This situation is putting at risk the combat know-how
acquired in external theatres of operations and dangerously reduces the capacity of
Belgium to commit itself abroad for the duration. As a result, Belgium has already
been forced to reduce its international commitments.
As is the case of the other EU member countries, Belgium’s security actually begins
in sub-Saharan Africa, in Iraq and Syria, in Afghanistan, and on the eastern flank. We
can be adamant that our military should have its boots on the ground among the very
sources of terrorism and not in the streets of Brussels.14
THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE LAND COMPONENT
We are in a war on terrorism. We need to conduct that war
and take it to the terrorists, not here at home.
– Craig L. Thomas
Defence personnel numbers are constantly decreasing and will be reduced to 25,000
according to the strategic vision of the MoD, even though the government demands
greater numbers.
The Land Component is on the brink of rupture: it has barely 6,000 combatants, of
whom only 350 – a thousand with rotations – are on mission abroad. Even instructors
and logistic personnel have been deployed in the streets.
In 2016, 12,000 military personnel were deployed at least once in OVG; towards the
end of 2016, the 1,828 soldiers on the street came from a cadre of 3,000 to 4,000
soldiers belonging to an exhausted Land Component. At some point in October 2016,
2,000 Belgian military personnel were deployed in operations, but 75% of them were
engaged in OVG and OSG.
Some 1,500 military personnel need to be recruited annually for at least five years to
catch up and reach a sufficient personnel level, to offset departures due to the age
structure, and to improve the chronic recruitment gap.
In 2017, the Land Component dispatched a transport company of about 90 soldiers
in support of the Enhanced Forward Presence operation in the Baltic countries. In
Lithuania, the 18th Logistics Battalion handed over the logistical support of this
operation to the 29th Logistics Battalion.
Belgium thus dispatches logistical elements on external missions, while the bulk of
skilled para-commandos and infantrymen are on the streets at home.
The commitment of the Land Component in OVG has resulted in an overall unavaila-
bility which eventually limited the individual and collective training of military
personnel to the minimum required for the planned missions (especially in Mali,
Afghanistan and Iraq), not to mention the need to daily put in place a domestic
supply chain which represents a burden as heavy as any supply chain used in opera-
tions abroad.
The government decided on 28 October 2016 to renew the defence commitments
for a further period until 2 December, but also to gradually reduce the maximum
authorised number of soldiers engaged in OVG from 1,828 to 1,250. This number
takes into account a safety margin of about 150 soldiers, a reserve that is immedi-
ately operational. Since then, the government has continued to extend OVG from
month to month.15
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customary societal norm; worse still, it does not in any way constitute the military’s
core business. The MoD mission statement still focuses on external security: i.e.,
external operations.
Accordingly, the government logically decided that the military personnel on the
streets may not exercise any policing function and are to act under the command of
the Federal Police. In the event of any suspicious activity, they must inform the
police. However, they may legitimately defend themselves. Their competences and
the prerogatives are severely delimited by their very strict Rules of Engagement.
This sometimes leads to awkward situations: if a soldier is a direct witness to a crime,
he is not entitled to intervene. In fact, the military are supposed to undertake an
aspect of police work without any responsibility or legal protection.
Manoeuvres and training
Since the attacks, more than 80% of the planned training schedule has been
discarded, which corresponds to a loss of nearly 100,000 hours. The 2016 training
programme was practically lost, and infantry training was often limited to platoon
level. The skills required to deploy a battle group in a conflict of a certain intensity
have been compromised.
This is appalling, because when a soldier, whose efficiency is based on intensive
training, no longer accomplishes complex exercises and manoeuvres, he loses skills
and qualifications. This insufficiency might put the safety of Belgian troops on a
mission abroad in danger in the long run.
It is true that training and exercises are expensive, but budgetary considerations
should not be the basis for decisions involving the operational value of troops.
In prison
Belgian military personnel were even required to perform ‘humanitarian’ interven-
tions in prisons following a dramatic situation that developed in Belgian penitentia-
ries between 9 May and 21 June 2016, accompanied by wardens’ strikes and picket
lines.
Initially, the wardens were relieved by the police. But when the police, lacking in
numbers and motivation, refused in turn to carry out prison tasks, the government
decided to requisition the army. The aim was to restore the basic rights of the
detainees, foster a return to calm and provide humanitarian support in the prisons in
an environment of multiplying incidents.16
THE BLURRING OF BELGIUM’S SECURITY: DELIBERATE OR UNINTENDED?Up to 180 soldiers were diverted from OVG to secure the three largest prisons in
Brussels, even though military personnel are not qualified for prison work.
Moreover, there were insufficient soldiers to carry out this mission, so they were
clearly ineffective.
This situation indicates, to the extreme, the inanity of incurring important costs for
training specialists who are assigned to tasks which are not their own.
Cost/efficiency
The primary goal of security spending is to ensure peace and safety. Like all public
goods, security requires significant resources, while its links with economic well-
being are, at first sight at least, relatively indirect.
This problem is thus rather a matter of balancing the general policy of the state,
taking into account the priorities required to meet all the government’s objectives.
However, analysis of the evolution of Belgium’s government functions demonstrates
the low priority given to security.
Thus, Belgium does not have the means (insufficient personnel, both in the armed
forces and in the police), the appropriate resources (no more reserves, no national
guard), nor adequate equipment.
Even if one can count on a rapid and decisive response to an emergency, military
units are still inefficient when operating in an unfamiliar environment, using
unfamiliar methods.
Detractors claim that it is inappropriate to impersonate an accountant and draw up
balance sheets for OVG and OSG, considering the dignity of the objectives pursued.
But in order to make the right decisions, it is crucial to assess the cost-effectiveness
of OVG and OSG and to determine whether these operations are a waste of capacity
and money.
In relation to the tasks assigned in OVG, the military are clearly overqualified.
Support for the Federal Police from the MoD therefore does not in any way corre-
spond to a sound application of cost-effectiveness principles. The intervention by the
armed forces is very expensive given the cost of the formation and training of the
military, elite soldiers and specialists in their areas of expertise, which do not corre-
spond to police tasks.
Some even go so far as to wonder whether the military is on its way to becoming a
gendarmerie (Biscop, 2015).17
OVERSTRETCHED AND HARASSED POLICE
The police are also operating in overdrive. A significant shortfall in police numbers
affects the 42,000 police currently serving, who must redouble their efforts relent-
lessly. Local police are increasingly called upon to help their federal colleagues, to the
detriment of local security. In 2016, even the traffic police force was stripped in
favour of OVG.
Because of the decline in investment in the police over the last ten years, and the
endemic lack of recruitment, the Central Directorate of the Fight Against Serious and
Organised Crime16 was compelled to engage all its capacities, though its other
responsibilities did not diminish, which resulted in mental fatigue and demotivation.
In 2016, the incapacity days taken by officers tripled compared to 2015. In the anti-
terrorist unit, 15% of agents were on sick leave. In January 2017, the police were fed
up with conditions, as shown by a protest led by several police officers from the
Brussels West area, who declared themselves unfit to work for medical reasons.
For 30 months, this problem has been solved by the presence of the army. This is in
no way a lasting solution, either for the police, or for defence.
Following swiftly on from the demotivation experienced by both police and the
military in domestic operations, recent government decisions or proposals are
unlikely to boost morale. One proposal is the profound reorganisation of the police
training system, resulting in the integration of the ten Belgan police schools into the
regular education system. Another is the planned reform of pensions in the public
sector, resulting in a substantial raising of the retirement age both in the police and
the military.
Private security
There is no disputing the fact that, at the macroeconomic level, defence is a global
public good and is only produced by the state. But the nature of security at the micro-
economic level – the protection of an individual – is different.
Before the attacks, every businessman, shopkeeper or citizen knew that he enjoyed
security; therefore, he unconsciously adopted a free-rider attitude. This derives from
the conception of the human being both as a rational and an individualistic Homo
economicus, who is only interested in profits and costs that affect him directly. He
knows that he cannot be excluded from the benefit of the public good that is
security, irrespective of whether he contributes or not.
16 Direction de la lutte contre la criminalité lourde et organisée (DJSOC). This branch of the Federal Police
deals with anti-terrorism.18
THE BLURRING OF BELGIUM’S SECURITY: DELIBERATE OR UNINTENDED?This lack of solidarity, leading to suboptimal results for society, can only be circum-
vented in two ways.
The first is the traditional route for all public goods: taxation. However, considering
the constraints imposed on public finances and the excessive taxation burden in
Belgium, this is not an adequate option.
Given the shortage of police forces and the need to withdraw the military in order to
let the MoD go about its core business, this leaves the second solution: private
security companies. In this case, like any other ‘public’ good provided by the private
sector, security would be charged at a price higher than the production cost, profit
margin included.
Not surprisingly, the number of private security companies is dramatically increasing.
Even federal and regional public services rely increasingly on privately employed
guards. Political authorities cannot afford to ignore the potential dangers faced by
their staff and clients. The also applies to international organisations located in
Belgium (EU, NATO, SHAPE, etc.).
Since the attacks of 22 March 2016, the role of private security companies has been
extended within the framework of measures adopted by the government. Today,
private security firms can employ former soldiers and policemen as soon as they
leave public service, whereas in the past, a five-year wait had to be respected.
In addition, each municipality can decide whether to designate private firms to
monitor places where potential danger exists, and security agents are now author-
ised to
• carry weapons (only for contracts on military areas and in some embassies);
• run searches, i.e., inspection of buildings or locations for the presence of
weapons, explosives and other dangerous items;
• scan people’s clothing (only in non-public places);
• perform a visual inspection of luggage and cars;
• be drivers for the transportation of detainees.
Legislation on surveillance cameras has also been adapted, with the aim of giving
additional means to police officers and investigators. The main objective is to
strengthen preventive intervention capacities, but also to strengthen powers of
investigation.
Security corps
Furthermore, the government approved on 18 May 2017 a draft bill intended to
create a Directorate of Security named DAB within the Federal Police to alleviate the
security burden and to allow police officers and military personnel to go about their
normal business.19
THE BLURRING OF BELGIUM’S SECURITY: DELIBERATE OR UNINTENDED?DAB’s main tasks will be securing the following places: royal palaces, SHAPE and
NATO infrastructures, international and European institutions, the buildings of
national and international authorities, critical infrastructure, security of police
operations, protection and security of nuclear sites, surveillance of courts and tribu-
nals, transfer of detainees and the infrastructures of Brussels Airport.
DAB will also be responsible for the momentary security of police operations and,
alternatively, of ceremonial escorts.. It will have a staff of 1,600. The draft bill first
deals with the transfer of staff from three existing services: security corps officials,
active military personnel with a rank of volunteer or NCO who apply and are selected,
and, finally, security officers currently assigned to Brussels Airport.
Gendarmerie
The creation of DAB nevertheless calls for an important consideration: is this not a
reinvention of the wheel, albeit a square wheel?
Indeed, the predecessor to the Federal Police, namely the Gendarmerie, was respon-
sible for the maintenance of public order and carried out its missions throughout the
territory under the supervision of the Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Defence.
It backed up anti-terrorist missions and helped when needed in prisons. It partici-
pated in territorial defence and its mobile units could be placed in support of the
armed forces. It could carry out military missions in wartime.
The Gendarmerie was, however, ‘demilitarised’ on 1 January 1992, and disappeared
eventually in 2001, after the creation of the integrated police.
Considering its capacity to adapt to the challenges of the fight against terrorism, as
well as the quality of its education and training, wouldn’t it have been more effective
to ‘reinvent’ the Gendarmerie?20
CONCLUSION
The government will probably keep the military on the streets throughout the legis-
lature, until 2019.
Given the enduring nature of the terrorist threat, does this mean that the presence
of soldiers in the streets represents a new ‘normal’? Are the tasks of the military
becoming more and more comparable to those of the police? Are we therefore
witnessing a permanent blurring of the distinction between police and defence
missions?
The situation on the ground underlines both the duality and the complementarity of
the two security concepts. But even if the Federal Police and the armed forces are
complementary because they pursue an identical overall objective – security – they
are not substitutes for one another.
Indeed, the military and the Federal Police pursue fundamentally different objec-
tives. The former performs ‘macro’ security interventions, while the latter operates
at ‘micro’ level. The military is not trained for the micro-level missions, except for
large-scale surface protection missions (nuclear power stations, strategic industrial
zonings, power distribution facilities and pipelines), which correspond more to their
core business.
It has been said on numerous occasions that the fight against terrorism should be
coordinated and even directed at the EU level. If more collaboration between
European countries is clearly needed, this can, however, not replace investments in
national capabilities.
This is precisely where the shoe pinches in Belgium. At both the police and military
levels, the lack of personnel and equipment is merely due to the deficiency in their
budgetary resources. Belgium should inspire confidence by increasing the security
budget, hence providing the means to meet its declared security ambitions. The two
aspects of security are neither cheap nor optional.
Belgium can no longer use its security budgets as a goal, as an instrument of fiscal
policy or as a discrete budgetary variable for fine-tuning government finances in
accordance with the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences norms. Neither
the army, underfinanced for decades, nor the police, in search of a balanced budget
since the beginning of this century, can supplement other failing public services.
Finally, there is really no controversy as to whether the blurring of Belgium’s security
roles was deliberate or unintended. At first, in the wake of terrorist attacks that
required a rapid reaction that justified the engagement of the army, the presence of
the soldiers in the streets was certainly unintended. Today, 30 months later, no one21
THE BLURRING OF BELGIUM’S SECURITY: DELIBERATE OR UNINTENDED?can deny that decision-makers have had plenty of time to take adequate measures
to return the armed forces to their regular missions.
Any deliberate and sustained use of the military in the streets is inappropriate; the
security of citizens on national territory is a matter for the police.
The presence of soldiers on the streets is as much use
as a poultice on a wooden leg.22
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